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Abstract
We characterize two diﬀerent approaches to the idea of equality of opportunity.
Roemer’s social ordering is motivated by a concern to compensate for the eﬀects
of certain (non-responsibility) factors on outcomes. Van de gaer’s social ordering
is concerned with the equalization of the opportunity sets to which people have
access. We show how diﬀerent invariance axioms open the possibility to go beyond
the simple additive speciﬁcation implied by both rules. This oﬀers scope for a
broader interpretation of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The traditional idea of equality of opportunity has been interpreted in two diﬀerent
ways in the recent social choice literature. A ﬁrst approach starts from the premise
that individual outcomes are determined by two types of factors: compensation fac-
tors and responsibility factors.1 The basic idea of equality of opportunity then is to
equalize individual outcomes to the extent that they reﬂect diﬀerences in compensation
factors, while allowing for diﬀerent outcomes whenever they are due to responsibility
factors. This focus on compensation of outcomes is prominent in the larger part of the
axiomatic literature –see, e.g., Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a, 1995b), Bossert
and Fleurbaey (1996), Iturbe-Ormaetxe (1997), Maniquet (1998, 2002). It is also the
basic inspiration of Roemer’s rule (Roemer, 1993, 1998, 2002).
A second approach to equality of opportunity focuses on the opportunity set to which
people have access, and tries to make these sets as equal as possible –see, e.g., Kranich
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1Roemer (2002) calls these “arbitrary” and “responsible” factors.
1(1996), and Ok and Kranich (1998). Compensation is deﬁned in terms of opportunity
sets. The concern for responsibility implies that only the set matters, while individuals
remain responsible for their choice. A rule which starts from this inspiration has been
proposed by Van de gaer (1993) and is further explored in Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van
de gaer (1999).
Of course the two approaches are related, since the opportunity set to which a person
with given compensation factors has access gives rise to the vector of possible outcomes
that he can obtain for diﬀerent values of responsibility factors. Yet their basic inspiration
is diﬀerent.
Roemer’s approach has been very popular in the recent past and it has resulted in a
series of thought provoking empirical applications (Llavador and Roemer, 2001, Roemer
et al., 2002, Roemer, 2002). As a matter of fact, in his recent “progress report”, Roemer
(2002) explicitly criticizes the alternative “opportunity set” approach, claiming that it
has not resulted in any empirical work because it remains too abstract and fails to take
suﬃcient cues from popular and long-standing conceptions of equality of opportunity.
As we will show, however, this criticism is certainly not valid for the Van de gaer-rule.
In many cases, both the Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule lead to exactly the same policy
prescriptions. This happens to be true in all the empirical applications referred to earlier.
In cases where the rules diﬀer, the Van de gaer-approach is even computationally simpler
than the Roemer-approach. Empirical applicability therefore cannot be an argument to
discard the CS-approach. In this paper, we want to explore in more detail the diﬀerences
between the Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule.
We brieﬂy review both rules in section 2. We illustrate how Roemer’s rule is an example
of the CO (compensating outcomes) approach, while Van de gaer’s rule is an example of
the CS (compensating sets) approach. Moreover, both rules assume an additive aggre-
gation rule. In section 3, we introduce notation and present both basic rules, together
with some extensions. Section 4 discusses the axioms and section 5 characterizes and
discusses the basic versions of the Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule. The axioms used in
the characterization reveal the strong and weak points of both. They also yield a better
insight into the implications of the additive aggregation rule underlying both social or-
derings. In section 6 we show how relaxing this additivity assumption will pave the way
for a characterization of some alternative rules (also proposed in Kolm, 2001). Section
7 concludes.
2 Two alternative rules
To set the scene, let us ﬁrst brieﬂy summarize both approaches in a ﬁnite setting. Let X
be the set of social options, e.g. the diﬀerent policy prescriptions. Individuals who are
homogeneous with respect to compensation factors are of the same “type”; we gather
the diﬀerent types i =1 ,...,m in a set M. In Roemer’s writings, the degree of eﬀort
is identiﬁed on the basis of the rank order of an individual within the distribution of
outcomes of his type. We will avoid this debatable identiﬁcation assumption.2 Individu-
als who are homogeneous with respect to responsibility characteristics have exerted the
2Roemer proposes to identify eﬀort on the basis of the quantiles of the outcome distribution for each
type. For a critical assessment of this quantile hypothesis, see Fleurbaey (1998) and Kolm (2001). For
a strong defence, see Roemer (2002).
2same “eﬀort”; the diﬀerent eﬀort levels j =1 ,...,nare collected in a set N.T os i m p l i f y
our exposition, we assume that each type-eﬀort couple (i,j) ∈ M ×N is represented by
exactly one individual; we abbreviate ij ∈ MN. Later on, we mention how to adapt the
rules, when relaxing this assumption. Outcomes are deﬁned by the social option, the







be a proﬁle of real-valued
outcome functions U
j
i ,o n ef o re a c ht y p e - e ﬀort couple ij,d e ﬁned as
U
j
i : X → R (or R++):x  → U
j
i (x).
To illustrate both approaches, we consider an economy with two types and ﬁve eﬀort
levels. Figure 1 presents the outcomes of both types under a certain social option x for


























type 1 type 2
Figure 1: Relation between eﬀort and outcome for two types
Either one tries to equalize the outcomes of diﬀerent types at the same eﬀort level: this
is the CO (compensating outcomes) approach to which Roemer’s rule belongs. Deﬁne
the social option xj which maximizes the minimal outcome of the diﬀerent types at
eﬀort level j,i . e .







It is rather unlikely that xj will be the same for all eﬀort levels. Therefore, it might be
interesting to look for a compromise approach, i.e. to look for an adequate aggregation
rule over the diﬀerent eﬀort levels. Roemer proposes –without much justiﬁcation– a





























type 1 type 2
Figure 2: Roemer’s sum-of-mins rule
Figure 2 presents the minimal outcomes for each eﬀort level in black; the Roemer-rule
wants to maximize the sum of these outcomes.
Or one tries to equalize the opportunity sets of the diﬀerent types; this is in line with
the CS (compensating sets) approach to which Van de gaer’s rule belongs. The Van
de gaer-rule follows Bossert (1997), who values an opportunity set solely on the basis
of the corresponding outcomes. Here again one has to deﬁne how to aggregate these
outcomes. Again without too much justiﬁcation, Van de gaer proposes a simple additive






Equalizing opportunity sets boils down to equalizing their valuation; the maximin-rule
readily suggests itself. Van de gaer’s rule maximizes the value of the opportunity set of










Figure 3 shows the outcomes of the most disadvantaged (lowest sum of outcomes) –here




















type 1 type 2
Figure 3: Van de gaer’s min-of-sums rule
Comparing (2) and (4) shows that the only formal diﬀerence is the interchange of the
min and the sum operator.3 Only if one type is the least advantaged for each eﬀort
level, both criteria lead to the same policy. Although formally similar, the basic intuition
behind both rules –CO versus CS– is very diﬀerent.4 The main aim of this paper is
to further explore the basic diﬀerences.
3 Social orderings
Notation Compared to the previous section, we will assume strong neutrality as
deﬁned in Roberts (1995) in an “extensive” social choice framework. As a consequence,
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
3In fact, Roemer (2002) presents the Van de gaer-rule as an alternative compromise procedure in
case the options x
j,d e ﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) ,a r ed i ﬀerent for some eﬀort levels. Roemer has no strong
preference for any of these alternatives over the other. In this spirit, our paper can be read as a
comparison of diﬀerent compromise procedures in the Roemer-approach. However, we feel that the
diﬀerences are deeper than suggested by this interpretation.
4Kolm (2001) suggests to interpret Roemer’s criterion via the normative concept “desert” and Van
de gaer’s in terms of its dual, “merit”.
5An ordering is a complete and transitive binary relation. P and I denote the corresponding asym-
















equals the outcome vector for eﬀort level j. We introduce
three rank-operators. The ﬁrst one ranks outcomes within each column of a matrix u
in an increasing way; the resulting matrix equals   u,w i t h  u
j
1 representing the lowest
outcome for eﬀort level j in the original matrix u and so on. The second one reranks
the rows in an increasing way, on the basis of the sum of its outcomes; the resulting
matrix equals
+













the opportunities of the type with the lowest
sum of outcomes in the original matrix u and so on. The ﬁnal one also reranks the rows
of a strictly positive matrix in an increasing way, but on the basis of the product of its
outcomes;
x
u is the matrix obtained from u in this way.
The Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule We present Roemer and Van de gaer’s
proposal, slightly modiﬁed to satisfy the strong Pareto principle; we therefore replace
maximin by leximin. The Roemer-rule can be rephrased as lexicographically maximizing








j∈N   v
j
i,i=1 ,...,m,
or, ∃s,1 ≤ s ≤ m :
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I nt h es a m ev e i n ,t h eVan de gaer-rule can be reformulated as lexicographically max-











































The main focus of this paper will be on the characterization of these two basic social
orderings. However, as mentioned already in the previous section, the sum-component
in both rules has hardly been justiﬁed in the literature until now. As a by-product
of our characterization we will better understand the consequences of this additive
speciﬁcation. In section 6, we will characterize some alternative rules.
The multiplicative Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule Instead of adding, we may
also multiply outcomes over diﬀerent eﬀort levels. Restricting the domain to strictly








j∈N   v
j
i,i=1 ,...,m,
or, ∃s,1 ≤ s ≤ m :
 












j∈N   v
j
s.
The product-Van de gaer-rule ranks uRv,i fa n do n l yi f
6If one allows for a diﬀerent number nij of individuals with characteristics ij ∈ MN, the elements
after the summation sign have to be weighted by the proportion pj =
 
i nij  
ij nij .
7Generally speaking, Van de gaer’s rule has to be based on sums of outcomes, weighted by the
conditional proportion pij/i =
nij  
j nij . Also the resulting comparison of two matrices has to be weighted










































Flexible Roemer- and Van de gaer-rules Finally, we introduce a Kolm-Atkinson-
Sen (KAS) and Kolm-Pollak (KP) speciﬁcation, which allows for a diﬀerent inequality
aversion parameter to aggregate over types (via ρM ∈ R)a n do v e re ﬀort (via ρN ∈ R).
These speciﬁcations have been proposed by Kolm (2001). The KAS-Roemer-family and

























































The KAS-Van de gaer-family and KP-Van de gaer-family invert the aggregation steps.




















































We focus on a social ordering deﬁned over matrices in a domain D,w i t hD equal to
Rm×n or Rm×n
++ :
• UD (unrestricted domain).R is deﬁned on D = Rm×n.
• PD (positive domain). R is deﬁned on D = Rm×n
++ .
Continuity is deﬁned as:
• CON (continuity).
For each u ∈ D; the better-than and worse-than sets {v ∈ D|vRu} and {v ∈ D|uRv}
are closed.
Eﬃciency boils down to the strong Pareto principle, which requires to prefer higher
outcomes. We deﬁne:
• SP (strong Pareto).




i for all ij ∈ MN,t h e nuRv. If, in addition, there exists
a kl ∈ MN such that ul
k >v l
k,t h e nuPv.
8The KAS-speciﬁcation is only well-deﬁned for strictly positive outcome matrices. As usual, when
ρ =0the KAS- and KP-speciﬁcations are equal to respectively a log-utilitarian and a utilitarian rule.
7The main diﬀerences between the CO-approach and the CS-approach are linked to sep-
arability, impartiality and compensation. The columns in Table 1 present the diﬀerent
axioms within these three classes, while the rows indicate the two main approaches. The
symbol + (resp. − ) indicates whether an axiom is typical (resp. atypical) for one of
both approaches; the symbol • refers to axioms that will be used in the next section to
characterize the Roemer- and the Van de gaer-rule.
Table 1: Compensating outcomes versus compensating sets
separability (SE) between impartiality (SI) for compensation (C)
eﬀort (N)t y p e ( M) eﬀort (N)t y p e ( M) (for type only)
SE∗
N SEN SE∗
M SEM   SEM SI∗
N SIN SI∗
M SIM CD C
CO ++− + • − • • + + •
CS − + +++• + − • − •
Separability For reasons that will become clear later on, separability assumptions
play only a minor role in the characterization of the basic Roemer-rule and Van de
gaer-rule (see table 1). They are more important to characterize the ﬂexible extensions
in section 6. In a CS-approach it seems straightforward to impose a separability require-
ment between the diﬀerent rows (opportunities of a type). Strong separability between
types eliminates indiﬀerent types: types with identical opportunities under two social
options do not play a role:
• SE∗




























I nt h es a m ew a yw ec a nd e ﬁne strong separability between eﬀort (columns). This axiom
eliminates indiﬀerent eﬀort levels, i.e. eﬀort levels with identical outcome vectors. This
axiom is very intuitive for the CO approach.
• SE∗




























For both separability requirements, we can also introduce a weaker version, which re-
quires separability in case of speciﬁc subdomains. DM contains matrices where outcomes
in each row are constant: eﬀort has no eﬀect on the outcomes of each type. DN consists
of matrices where outcomes in each column are constant: type has no eﬀect on the
outcomes for each eﬀort level.
• SEM (separability between types).
SE∗





8• SEN (separability between eﬀort).
SE∗





Similar to Ebert (1988), we could require separability between types, but only for
column-ordered matrices. Recall the rank operator ∼;w ed e ﬁne
  D = {v ∈ D|∃u ∈ D such that v =   u},
and we get:
•   SEM (ordered separability between types).
SE∗




∈   D.
For the characterization of the Roemer-rule we will only need this last axiom   SEM;a l s o
the Van de gaer-rule satisﬁes it.
Impartiality Much more important are the impartiality requirements. Suppes’
indiﬀerence implies that the “names” of the types (resp. eﬀort levels) do not matter.
We will deﬁne it in two diﬀerent strengths: we can permute rows (resp. columns), but
stronger, we can also permute outcomes withine a c hc o l u m n( r e s p .r o w )s e p a r a t e l y .L e t
σ denote a permutation of a set. When reasoning within a CS-approach, the following
combination of axioms seems reasonable:
• SIM (Suppes’ indiﬀerence for types).
For each u ∈ D and for all permutations σ on M;w eh a v euIu
 










N (strong Suppes’ indiﬀerence for eﬀort).
For each u ∈ D and for each m-tuple (σ1,...,σm) of permutations on N;w eh a v e
uIu
 









The ﬁrst axiom SIM is a natural requirement from a CS perspective. It imposes that
the diﬀerent types should be treated in a symmetric way: their opportunity vectors can
be permuted without inﬂuencing the social evaluation. The second one, SI∗
N,i sa l s oa
plausible requirement if we look at the rows of the matrices as embodying the values
of the opportunity sets to which diﬀerent individuals have access. It imposes that only
the whole vector of opportunities matters, not the speciﬁc link between each eﬀort level
and the resulting outcome.
On the other hand, in the CO-approach we can reasonably assume:
• SIN (Suppes’ indiﬀerence for eﬀort).
For each u ∈ D and for all permutations σ on N;w eh a v euIu
 










M (strong Suppes’ indiﬀerence for types).
For each u ∈ D and for each n-tuple
 
σ1,...,σn 
of permutations on M;w eh a v e
uIu
 









9In the CO-setting, SI∗
M is a very natural requirement. When comparing the outcomes
for diﬀerent types at the same eﬀort level, the identity of the types should not matter.
SIN permutes entire columns, or the names of the eﬀort levels do not matter.
Compensation In the CO approach, compensation requires equalization of the
outcomes of the diﬀerent types who exerted the same eﬀort. In the spirit of Hammond
(1976), we deﬁne:
• C (compensation).








i,w h i l euh
g = vh
g for
all other gh  = ij,kj,t h e nuPv.
In the CS-approach however, compensation focuses on the equalization of opportunity
vectors. Valuing opportunity vectors is a diﬃcult problem and we do not want to impose
strong assumptions about it at this stage. We therefore start from the simple idea that
an opportunity set is “better” than another if it gives rise to higher outcomes for all




k, for all j in N,
while for at least one l in N,w eh a v eul
i >u l
k. Adding such a dominance requirement
to the previous compensation axiom gives us dominance compensation:9
• DC (dominance compensation).








i,w h i l e
uh
g = vh
g for all other gh  = ij,kj,t h e nuPv.
The Van de gaer-rule implies much more than only a dominance condition with re-
spect to the evaluation of opportunity sets. It incorporates the following utilitarian
compensation principle:10
• UC (utilitarian compensation).
















i,w h i l euh
g = vh
g for all gh / ∈ iN ∪ kN,t h e nuPv.
We do not use this stronger axiom for the characterization of the Van de gaer-rule, but
we show that it is implied by the combination of other axioms. For later reference,
we ﬁnish by introducing the idea of utilitarian neutrality. If the sum of opportunities
remains the same for all types, then we should rank the matrices as indiﬀerent:
• UN (utilitarian neutrality).








i for all i in M,t h e nuIv.
9This diﬀers from the approach taken by Ok and Kranich (1998) who advocate to deﬁne equaliza-
tion of opportunity sets for a given “cardinality-based” ordering of all possible opportunity sets. Our
“ordinality-based” notion of dominance compensation is the equivalent of “opportunity dominance for
a policy” as introduced by Hild and Voorhoeve (2001).
10The cartesian product {i}×N is abbreviated as iN.
105R e s u l t s
The Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule Roemer’s CO-approach focuses on the
diﬀerences between the outcomes for diﬀerent types at the same eﬀort level, i.e. on the
inequality within the columns of the outcome matrix. It then seems natural to require
that the social evaluation should be invariant if all outcomes within the columns are
changed by the same absolute number or are changed in the same proportion since
such changes do not aﬀect absolute or relative inequality, respectively. We will see
that the Roemer-rule focuses on absolute inequality within a column. Roemer remains
agnostic, however, about the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent columns. Therefore, the
social evaluation does not depend on the diﬀerences between outcomes at diﬀerent eﬀort
levels.
To formalize this idea, consider Σ the domain of matrices α ∈ Rm×n with all elements








For all u,v ∈ D and for all α ∈ Σ; uRv holds if and only if (u + α)R(v + α).
Notice that Itn
tf implies separability between eﬀort levels SEN.T h ea x i o mI tn
tf means that
the social judgment does not change provided that the absolute diﬀerences in outcomes
at each eﬀort level, i.e. within each column, are preserved. At the same time, since
the elements of matrix α may diﬀer over diﬀerent eﬀort levels, diﬀerences in outcomes
between the columns are irrelevant for the social evaluation. Within the CO-approach,
the Itn
tf axiom forces us to focus on the inequality of outcomes, irrespective of the level
at which these inequalities are evaluated.
The Itn
tf axiom is equally relevant in the CS-approach. Indeed, if the diﬀerence in out-
comes for each eﬀort level remains the same, then the diﬀerence in the valuation of
the opportunity sets also remains the same. If one wants to focus on the inequality
of the sets, the α-transformation should therefore not lead to a change in the relative
evaluation of diﬀerent opportunity sets.
We are now ready to formulate our two basic characterization results:11
Proposition 1. For each row in the table, there is only one social ordering R which
satisﬁes the axioms indicated by •; it is the rule in the ﬁrst column. In addition, +
(resp. − ) means that the rule satisﬁes (violates) the corresponding axiom:
UD Itn
tf SP DC   SEM SI∗
M SIM SI∗
N SIN
Roemer •••• • • + − •
Van de gaer •••• + − •• +
Discussion From a formal point of view, the invariance axiom Itn
tf is identical to
an assumption of limited comparability, introduced in Ooghe and Lauwers (2002). It
amounts to translation-scale measurability (T) combined with full comparability (F)
between the types for a given eﬀort level and no comparability (N) between eﬀort levels
for a given type. Note that the only separability assumption used in the characterization
11All the proofs are put together in the appendix.
11of the Roemer-rule is   SEM. This axiom is also satisﬁed by the Van de gaer-rule, but it is
redundant for its characterization. The reason for the limited importance of separability
axioms is that their potential role is taken over by invariance via Itn
tf and equity via
DC; Ooghe and Lauwers (2002) provide an alternative characterization of the Roemer-
rule, via stronger separability requirements, combined with a weaker (minimal) equity
requirement.
More surprising is the fact that we use in both cases the same dominance compensation
axiom DC. The only substantial diﬀerences are the impartiality axioms. As we show
next, they have strong implications.
The proof of the Van de gaer-rule makes use of the following lemma 1, showing that the
combination of the invariance axiom Itn
tf with strong Suppes’ indiﬀerence between eﬀort
levels SI∗
N implies utilitarian neutrality UN:
Lemma 1. If a social ordering R deﬁned on D satisﬁes UD, Itn
tf and SI∗
N,t h e ni ta l s o
satisﬁes UN.
It is clear that UN makes sense only in the CS approach, where sets are measured by the
sum of the outcomes of those that have the same compensation characteristic. Lemma
1 shows that, in combination with UD and Itn
tf ,t h ea x i o mS I ∗
N brings us already a long
way in the direction of the Van de gaer-rule. This becomes even more transparent when
we impose also the dominance compensation axiom DC, because one can show
Lemma 2. If a social ordering R deﬁned on D satisﬁes UD, Itn
tf ,S I ∗
N and DC, then it
also satisﬁes UC.
The other impartiality requirement SI∗
M plays an equally important role in the charac-
terization of the Roemer-rule. Imposing it indeed implies a considerable strengthening
of the rather weak idea of dominance compensation. This is summarized in the following
lemma:
Lemma 3. If a social ordering R deﬁned on D satisﬁes UD, SI∗
M and DC, then it also
satisﬁes C.
Note that we described in the previous section how compensation C captures the main
intuition of the CO-approach. The basic incompatibility between the Roemer- and the
Van de gaer-rule can be summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Suppose m,n ≥ 2. A social ordering R deﬁned on D cannot satisfy PD, C
and UN simultaneously.
Combining these various lemmas, we obtain the following message. Under UD and Itn
tf ,
we cannot combine DC with both SI∗
M and SI∗
N. Hence, if we want to keep UD, Itn
tf and
D C ,w ew i l lh a v et oc h o o s ee i t h e rS I ∗
M,o rS I ∗
N.C h o o s i n gS I ∗
M implies choosing C and
choosing SI∗
N implies choosing UN, and even UC. The choice between both impartiality
axioms can therefore be seen as the choice between compensating outcomes via C,
or compensating opportunity sets via UC, where the value of the opportunity sets is
measured as the sum of the outcomes achieved by individuals with the same type.
Limitations Figure 4 may be helpful to see the limitations of both approaches. It
presents the opportunity sets of two types over ﬁve eﬀort levels in black; except for the



















type 1 type 2
Figure 4: Roemer versus Van de gaer
Now, suppose we can redistribute outcomes for the lowest eﬀort level only, such that
outcome levels after the transfer (in white) coincide. According to the Roemer-rule,
which satisﬁes C, this policy is an improvement, although now type 1 dominates type 2;
the CO-approach neglects opportunity set considerations. The Van de gaer-rule, which
satisﬁes UC, would prefer the inverse policy, which brings inequality at the lowest eﬀort
level; the CS-approach neglects outcome diﬀerences of individuals who exert the same
eﬀort.
L e m m a4a n dt h eﬁgures suggest that there is really a basic diﬀerence between the
Roemer- and the Van de gaer-rule –a diﬀerence which goes deeper than a simple
normalization. At the same time, however, both rules also have analogous weaknesses.
Consider a situation with only one type. Both the Roemer- and the Van de gaer-rule will
then evaluate diﬀerent policies in a utilitarian fashion, i.e. as the sum of the outcomes at
the diﬀerent eﬀort levels. It has been argued (see, e.g., Fleurbaey, 1998) that this goes
against the intuition of the idea of equal opportunity because the government should
not intervene if the diﬀerences between outcomes result only from diﬀerences in eﬀort
and should simply accept the laissez-faire outcomes. It is true that this is the usual
interpretation of equality of opportunity. At the same time, however, a broader idea
of responsibility-sensitivity does not necessarily imply an absolute respect for laissez-
faire. It is possible to take the position that the social evaluation should focus on
opportunities (and opportunity sets) rather than on outcomes while at the same time
p o s t u l a t i n gad e ﬁnite idea about what should be the optimal form of these sets. In the
latter interpretation it seems useful to think about ways to formulate a more ﬂexible
approach than the sum-speciﬁcation of both the Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule.
6E x t e n s i o n s
The multiplicative extensions In the previous section, we have shown that both
the Roemer- and the Van de gaer-rule satisfy the invariance axiom Itn
tf . It is not obvious
that this is an attractive idea. First, it implies an absolute approach to the evaluation
13of inequality of opportunity. Such an absolute approach is not the most popular in the
literature on inequality measurement. Second, it implies a complete agnosticism about
the ethical evaluation of diﬀerences between the outcomes related to diﬀerent eﬀort
levels.
The most obvious alternative to Itn
tf is to follow the dominant relative approach to
inequality measurement: within a column we look at relative, rather than absolute
diﬀerences in outcomes. This means that we only allow for ratios of outcomes between
types with the same responsibility factors to be relevant. Consider Π the domain of
diagonal matrices β ∈ Rn×n with strictly positive diagonal entries βi
i > 0, and zero
elsewhere. We then propose:
• Irn
rf (invariance axiom)
For all u,v ∈ D and for all β ∈ Π; uRv holds if and only if (uβ)R(vβ).
Similar to Itn
tf , this invariance axiom Irn
rf implies separability between eﬀort levels SEN.
Furthermore, Irn
rf preserves the relative inequality between outcomes for a given eﬀort
level. Since this holds for all eﬀort levels, it can be maintained that this does not change
the inequality of opportunity sets, either if one takes a relative perspective on inequality.
With the necessary change in domain, we get:
Proposition 2. For each row in the table, there is only one social ordering R which
satisﬁes the axioms indicated by •; it is the rule in the ﬁrst column. In addition, +
(resp. − ) means that the rule satisﬁes (violates) the corresponding axiom:
PD Irn
rf SP DC   SEM SI∗
M SIM SI∗
N SIN
product-Roemer •••• • • + − •
product-Van de gaer •••• + − •• +
The ﬂexible extensions We can go further and drop the assumption of non-
comparability between columns. Again, this is easily done by exploiting the analogy
with the classical invariance requirements in the social choice literature. We deﬁne:
• Itf
tf (invariance axiom).
















For all u,v ∈ D and for all β ∈ R++;w eh a v euRv i fa n do n l yi f(βu)R(βv).
Itf
tf (resp. Irf
rf) does not imply separability between eﬀort levels; separability axioms will
be imposed directly. Furthermore, Itf
tf (resp. Irf
rf) only compares situations that keep the
absolute (resp. relative) diﬀerences between outcomes at all eﬀort levels constant. These
weaker axioms allow us to express a wide spectrum of opinions about inequalities that
are due to type and eﬀort. The following proposition characterizes the Kolm-Atkinson-
Sen (KAS) and Kolm-Pollak (KP) speciﬁcation for the Roemer- and Van de gaer-rule:
Proposition 3. For each row in the table, there is only one family of social orderings R
which satisﬁes the axioms indicated by •;i ti st h ef a m i l yi nt h eﬁrst column. In addition,
14+ (resp. − ) means that each rule in the family satisﬁes (violates) the corresponding
axiom:
PD Irf





KAS-R ••• • • • + • + •
KAS-VDG ••• • • + •• • +
UD Itf
tf
KP-R ••• • • • + • + •
KP-VDG ••• • • + •• • +
R stands for Roemer and VDG for Van de gaer.
It remains true that the main diﬀerences between the (broad) Roemer- and Van de
gaer-approaches (and therefore also between the CO and the CS approaches to equality
of opportunity) are revealed by the impartiality axioms, but they are here reinforced by
speciﬁc separability axioms.
We can conclude that the invariance axiom Itn
tf is crucial in explaining the sum-assumption
which is imposed both by Roemer and Van de gaer. Alternatives to these rules are read-
ily available for those who do not like the (strong) implications of Itn
tf : absolute inequality
measurement within a column, i.e. for a given eﬀort level, and complete neglect of dif-
ferences in outcome levels between columns, i.e. for diﬀerent eﬀort levels. Of course,
none of these alternatives counters the criticism that with one type the laissez-faire
outcomes should be respected. However, if one accepts the broader interpretation of
responsibility-sensitivity in which the social evaluation also depends on the form of the
opportunity sets, the increased ﬂexibility gained by relaxing Itn
tf seems a deﬁnite im-
provement. Note that by imposing even weaker invariance requirements than Itf
tf and
Irf
rf, many additional functional forms become possible.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Although the Roemer- and Van de gaer-rules are formally similar, their basic intuition is
very diﬀerent. This diﬀerence goes much deeper than a mere diﬀerence in normalization.
The former exploits the idea of compensating for diﬀerent outcomes, if these diﬀerences
follow from diﬀerences in non-responsibility or compensation factors. The latter focuses
on the evaluation of opportunity sets and wants to make their “value” as equal as
possible. As we have shown, both approaches are incompatible in general. While they
lead to similar policy prescriptions in many cases (and to identical policy prescriptions
if there is one type whose opportunity set is dominated by all the other types), this
should not detract us from the diﬀerences in ethical inspiration. It would be interesting
to further explore these diﬀerences in concrete applications.12 More empirical work
could be very fruitful in this regard.
Both rules satisfy an invariance axiom which we have labeled Itn
tf .I ti sr e ﬂected in the
additive speciﬁcation underlying both the original Roemer- and Van de gaer rules. The
12Van de gaer et al. (2001) explore the justiﬁcation of the rules in the context of the measurement of
intergenerational mobility.
15axiom Itn
tf imposes that the social evaluation does not change if the same constant is
added to the outcomes of all types at a given eﬀort level. This essentially implies an
absolute approach to inequality measurement. Moreover, these constants may diﬀer
at diﬀerent eﬀort levels, implying that diﬀerences between the outcomes related to
diﬀerent eﬀort levels do not matter. All these assumptions are debatable. However, we
have shown that introducing other invariance axioms leads to rules of the Roemer- and
Van de gaer-family with a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation.
The importance of this increased ﬂexibility should not be underestimated. As has been
noted by Fleurbaey (1998), neither the Roemer- nor the Van de gaer-rule satisfy the
traditional notion of equality of opportunity implying that the laissez-faire outcome
should be respected in cases where there is only one type. This is one speciﬁcn o t i o no f
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, however. It can also be argued that responsibility
matters, i.e. that eﬀort should be rewarded, while at the same time putting forward
deﬁnite ideas about how it should be rewarded and, more speciﬁcally, without accepting
that the laissez-faire rewards to eﬀort are necessarily ideal from an ethical point of view.
This requires that the form of opportunity sets is evaluated, even if there is only one type.
The additive (or utilitarian) speciﬁcation underlying the original Roemer- and Van de
gaer-rules may not be the most attractive candidate for such an evaluation exercise. The
more ﬂexible speciﬁcations introducing a parameter of inequality aversion can then be
seen as a ﬁrst step into the direction of such a broader notion of responsibility-sensitive
egalitarianism.
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18Appendix
P r o o fo fl e m m a ’ s1 - 4
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 If a social ordering R deﬁned on D satisﬁes UD, Itn
tf and SI∗
N,
then it also satisﬁes UN. Consider a matrix u ∈ D and two couples ij,ik in MN.
Construct a matrix v by permuting elements ij and ik in matrix u. Using SI∗
N we
have uIv. Add an arbitrary amount α ∈ R to the outcomes in the j- t hc o l u m no fb o t h




;u s i n gI tn




. Permute the elements ij




a n db yS I ∗










   
and v
  
= v;f r o mI tn
tf ,r e ﬂexivity and transitivity of R,w eh a v eu
   
Iv.B y
construction, the matrix u
   
is everywhere equal to v, except for outcomes u





   k
i = vk
i + α. Hence, we may remove outcome mass within a row of a matrix v,
without changing social welfare. Repeatedly using this transfer principle, UN must hold,
as required. 
P r o o fo fl e m m a2 If a social ordering R deﬁned on D satisﬁes UD, Itn
tf ,S I ∗
N and
DC, then it also satisﬁes UC. From lemma 1, we know that UD, Itn
tf and SI∗
N implies UN.
We prove that adding DC also implies UC. Suppose the antecedents of UC are true for
















i,w h i l euh
g = vh









































g,∀gh / ∈ G.









From transitivity also uPv holds. 
P r o o fo fl e m m a3 If a social ordering R deﬁned on D satisﬁes UD, SI∗
M and DC,
then it also satisﬁes C. Suppose the antecedents of C are true for u,v ∈ D and for ij,kj








i,w h i l euh
g = vh





by reranking all columns diﬀerent from j, either increasingly
or decreasingly depending on whether i<kor i>k .F r o m S I ∗









and thus also uPv must hold, as
required. 
P r o o fo fl e m m a4 Suppose m,n ≥ 2. A social ordering R deﬁned on D cannot
satisfy PD, C and UN simultaneously. First, consider the following four matrices which


























Using C we have uPv.U s i n gU N ,w eh a v evIu
 





Everything together, we obtain by transitivity that uPv
 
must hold. This contradicts
19UN, which requires uIv
 
. We can always embed these four matrices in larger ones
belonging to Rm×n
++ , which completes the proof.13 
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1
A. The Roemer-rule It is easy to verify that the Roemer-rule satisﬁes all axioms
UD, Itn
tf ,S P ,D C ,  SEM,S I ∗
M and SIN. We prove the converse. Let R be the Roemer
social ordering and let R be an ordering satisfying all axioms. We have to prove R = R.
Consider two arbitrary matrices u,v ∈ D and suppose uRv. Using SI∗
M,i ts u ﬃces to
prove   uR  v.
Consider the following procedure α(r),w i t hr ∈ M, applied to arbitrary matrices u,v:
(i): Rerank the columns of each matrix such that the outcomes in the rth row of both





(ii): Deﬁne a matrix α ∈ Rm×n,w i t he l e m e n t sα
j








;b yd e ﬁnition α ∈ Σ
(see axiom Itn









(Using SIN in step (i)a n dI tn





to be the same)
Now, starting with matrices   u,  v, we can apply procedure α(1) a ﬁnite number of times


















1 =( 0 ,...,0)
case 2 (s>1): u
 
1 =( 0 ,...,0) = v
 
1.




. We present a new procedure, only for case 1, to ensure that all
elements in the ﬁrst row of u become equal to zero (as in case 2). Consider a procedure
β (r), applied to matrices u,v (although only u will be changed):












; ε > 0.
(ii): For all j in N,w h e r eu
j
r > 0: perform a series of inequitable transfers, i.e. reduce
u
j




m.W e o b t a i n a m a t r i x u
 
with
the rth row also equal to zero.
(Using DC, we have uPu
 
;i ti st h u ss u ﬃcient to prove u
 
Rv if one wants to obtain
uRv)













. We proceed for both cases 1 and 2 with
a new procedure γ (r) for some arbitrary matrices u,v:





13Notice that this result depends nor on the completeness of the social relation, neither on the Ham-
mond nature of the compensation axiom; also a weaker Pigou-dalton type compensation, where average
outcomes are kept constant, would be suﬃcient to generate a conﬂict with UN.






















must be the same)




(from case 1 +




(from case 2) untill, for the resulting matrices, say u
   
,v




case 1 (s =1 ,2): u
   
2 >v
   
2 =( 0 ,...,0) = u
   
1 ,v
   
1
case 2 (s>2): u
   
2 = u
   
1 =( 0 ,...,0) = v
   
1 = v
   
2
Only for case 1, apply procedure β (2), to reduce the outcomes in the ﬁrst two rows of
u
   
to zero. Then proceed with procedure γ (3), again for both cases, and so on. In the




i for all ij in MN and using SP
completes the proof. 
B. The Van de gaer-rule It is easy to verify that the Van de gaer rule satisﬁes
all axioms UD, Itn
tf ,S P ,D C ,S I ∗
N and SIM. We prove the converse. Let R be the Van de
gaer social ordering and let R be an ordering satisfying all axioms. We have to prove
R = R.F r o ml e m m a1 ,R has to satisfy UN. As a consequence, it suﬃces to consider





1 (∈ R)0 ... 0
...
u1
m (∈ R)0... 0


Consider two matrices u,v ∈ D and deﬁne an ordering R◦ such that u1R◦v1 ⇔ uRv.T h e
induced ordering R◦ is well-deﬁned on Rm×1,a n ds a t i s ﬁes SP, SIM and C (from SP,
SIM and DC). But then R◦ has to be the leximin rule (see Bossert and Weymark, 1996,
theorem 15),14 which completes the proof. 
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2
First, consider a social ordering R satisfying PD and Irn
rf .D e ﬁne a social ordering R◦
such that for all u,v ∈ Rm×n






for x = u,v. It is easy to see that R◦ has to satisfy UD and Itn
tf . Second, if we impose one
of the axioms SP, DC,   SEM,S I ∗
M,S I M,S I ∗
N or SIN on R, then the same axiom must
hold for R◦. Finally, we can use proposition 1 to characterize R◦: depending on whether
we additionally impose the set SP, DC,   SEM,S I ∗
M,S I N or the set SP, DC, SIM,S I ∗
N,
we obtain that R◦ must be the Roemer-rule (resp. Van de gaer-rule). By deﬁnition of
both rules and by deﬁnition of R◦, we get that R must be the Roemer-rule (resp. Van
de gaer-rule), but applied to logarithmically transformed matrices; this is equal to the
product-Roemer-rule (resp. product-Van de gaer-rule) applied to the original matrices
u,v ∈ Rm×n
++ .
14Notice that C is stronger compared to Hammond equity, but satisﬁed by the leximin rule.
21P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3
We prove the characterization for the KAS-Roemer-family; the other cases are anal-
ogous. Consider a social ordering R satisfying PD, SE∗
N,S I N and CON. Adapting
Debreu’s (1959) representation theorem for SE∗
N and SIN, this social ordering can be
represented by continuous functions f : Rn
++ → R++ and g : Rm
++ → R++, such that
















and –via SIN and SE∗
N– the function f has to be additively separable and symmetric.
From SEM and SI∗
M, also the function g has to be additively separable and symmetric.
From SP and Irf
rf, both functions f and g have to be strictly increasing and homothetic.
The class of strictly increasing, additive separable, symmetric and homothetic functions
is the KAS-class of functions, as required.
22